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Abstract 
Unlicensed driving is a serious problem in many Australian states, with unlicensed driving-
related crashes (UDC) costing up to $300 million per year in Queensland, and $171 million in 
Victoria. In this paper, we present a Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) analysis of ITS technologies 
aimed at preventing unlicensed driving by verifying the driver’s identity through biometric 
technology, as well as the validity of their licence; essentially a form of licence interlock. The 
goal is to provide preliminary recommendations as to which technology is the most beneficial 
and should be implemented as part of a government-led program increasing the functionalities 
of Queensland electronic driving licenses (EDL). Fingerprints and finger vascular patterns 
recognition technologies are found to systematically have the best BCRs. The most beneficial 
implementation scenarios involve a mandatory system for all banned drivers (suspensions & 
disqualifications), and a mandatory system for banned drivers under the age of 21 only. This 
latter scenario performs extremely well, with returns up to 16 times the investment with a 
simple fingerprints-based interlock. Although often more modest, all systems are found to 
have BCRs above 1 in all our scenarios expect one. 
 
Keywords: 
Unlicensed drivers, interlock, biometrics. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Unlicensed driving is a serious and multi-facets issue in Australia, with people illegally 
operating motor vehicles on the roads and posing a greater risk to other legitimate drivers due 
to a higher crash rate [1]. Unlicensed drivers are also overrepresented in severe crashes [2], 
single vehicle crashes and those that involve no traffic control [3]. Previous research has also 
linked unlicensed driving with recreational road use and drink-driving [4]. Data sourced from 
the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) suggest that unlicensed 
drivers were involved in 6.61% of all crashes and 12.05% of fatal crashes from 2005 to 2013. 
Data for 2003-07 in Victoria give 5.9% for fatal crashes [5]. The social cost of unlicensed 
driving is thus approximately $304 million per annum in Queensland. Given this cost, it is 
legitimate to search for solutions to reduce the frequency of unlicensed driving. With the 
ongoing deployment and improvement of modern technologies in cars, both in terms of driver 
assistance, autonomous manoeuvring, or entertainment, technology seems to offer a solution 
to the unlicensed driving issue too. Arguably, licensing technology that links drivers to 
vehicles holds significant potential to reduce unlicensed driving as well as corresponding 
crash involvement. 
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Not all unlicensed drivers (ULD) are similar: while many have had their license suspended or 
cancelled, or have been disqualified, due to a past driving offence, others may be driving with 
expired licenses that they simply forgot to renew or having the incorrect licence class for the 
vehicle they are operating. Intervention that target ULD can either be targeted at the whole 
group of ULD or at any subgroup, e.g. disqualified drivers only.  
 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) has been flagged as one approach to detect 
ULD and shown some deterrent effect [3]. However, ANPR can only help stop ULD once 
they are on the road and providing they drive their own vehicle, allowing a period of time 
during which they could still crash. A more efficient approach would be to completely stop 
ULD from being able to use their vehicle. In this regard, a previous study by AARB [1] have 
concluded that the most effective tool to prevent unlicensed driving is an electronic driving 
licence interlock (EDLI). Such a system uses the driving licence as the ignition key to unlock 
the ignition providing that a valid licence is presented. There is a shortage of peer-reviewed 
research on EDLIs, with ongoing debate on (1) the most appropriate technologies, (2) the best 
implementation approaches, and (3) current barriers and, conversely, potential facilitators to 
widespread deployment. Trials were undertaken in Sweden in the mid-1990s [6-8], the most 
concrete research so far in this domain, but seemingly never led to any implementation among 
the general public. Since the 1990s, improvements in biometrics have led to several EDLI 
system based on those to be proposed [9, 10]. Biometrics offer a wide potential to verify the 
identity of the driver, allowing an EDLI to be much more difficult to circumvent. Indeed, a 
simple EDL-based system like the one tested in Sweden only verifies that the presented EDL 
is valid; if it does not verify the identity of the person presenting this licence, it would be 
fairly easy for a disqualified or suspended driver to use the licence of a friend or partner.  
 
Following the conclusions of Baldock, Royals [1] and Catchpole [5], it is appropriate to start 
quantify the exact benefits expected from the implementation of an EDLI, as well as quantify 
their costs to estimate their exact social benefit. Thus, the goal of this paper is to perform such 
analysis and compute the benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) for different types of EDLI based on 
biometric technology. Eventually, we aim at being able to identify technologies and 
implementation scenarios (e.g. which population should be targeted for deployment) in order 
to maximise benefits. Preliminary recommendations can then be made for the benefit of road 
safety stakeholders and help direct future research toward the most promising technologies. 
 
The methodology used in this paper is divided into 4 main parts. A first, the social cost of 
ULD-related crashes in Queensland will be estimated based on data provided by TMR for the 
2005-2013 period; the aim will be to extract the cost of crashes involving ULD, both multiple 
and single vehicle crashes, and calculate the cost per annum and per drivers. Then, a survey of 
existing biometric technologies that are applicable to create an EDLI will be undertaken, 
getting critical information such as the efficiency of the technology and the cost of such 
devices. Different EDLIs based on different technologies will be considered. Then, based on 
the results from the first part, in a third part a number of implementation scenarios will be 
designed. Those scenarios will control exposure to the EDLI, allowing estimating the benefits 
expected from the different systems and technologies when implemented in the real world. 
Finally in a fourth part using all the information gathered in the rest of this paper we will 
compute the Benefit-Cost ratios (BCR) for the different EDLIs in the proposed 
implementation scenarios. The BCR evaluation method will follow the approaches found in 
[11-14]. The discussion of the BCR results will allow to observe trends and conclude which 
scenarios and technologies are the most beneficial to prevent ULD-related crashes and, thus, 
should be considered for future more in-depth research and implementation. 
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2. Social costs of unlicensed driver crashes in Queensland 
 
The cost of unlicensed driving-related crashes (UDC) in Queensland is estimated to be 
$303.09 million per annum on average over the years 2005 to 2013 (based on social cost 
estimates created by TMR); the total cost over this period was $2.5 billion. This estimate 
includes all crashes that involved at least one unlicensed driver; however, it can be argued that 
not all these crashes are caused by unlicensed driving. Indeed, in a crash with more than 2 
vehicles, the data used to compute this estimate do no convey the notion of fault. It is then 
impossible to determine precisely the degree of involvement of unlicensed drivers in those 
crashes. On the other hand, for crashes that include one or two vehicles it can be reasonably 
argued that this crash would not have happened if the ULD was not on the road that day 
regardless of fault. Indeed, even if the ULD was not at fault, they were illegally present on the 
road; removing them from the road may have been sufficient to prevent said crash. 
Henceforth we will be making the assumption that only such crashes are preventable by an 
unlicensed driving prevention system (EDLI) and present data relating to those only; they 
represent more than 70% of the total cost. The cost of single and double vehicles crashes 
involving an ULD was $271.57 million per annum, or $2.2 billion between 2005 and 2013. 
8,745 ULD were involved in those crashes, meaning the average cost per driver was 
$255,481.  
 
In terms of gender, the offenders are largely male (6753 males versus 1992 female). Drivers 
less than 25 are the largest group, and those under 21 are particularly well represented, 
although not the costliest group per driver. Older drivers (60+) are the costliest category per 
driver ($284K) but are only present in small numbers. Drivers at age 25-39 are outliers in 
terms of single vehicle crash costs with $346K per driver, 35% higher than average; they are 
also the second highest age group for all crashes.  
 
In terms of offence category (including cancelled & disqualified, unlicensed
1
, never held, 
expired and inappropriate) the costliest group per driver is the inappropriate class group 
($438k); in this group, the offending driver was usually driving a motorcycle without the 
proper permit and crashes involve a significant proportion of hospitalisations. The safest 
category of offender is people that drove with an expired licence, possibly unknowingly, at 
only $186K per driver. The most common group was cancelled & disqualified for $250k per 
driver; 4225 such drivers were involved in accidents between 2005 and 2013, or 
approximately 2% of the drivers banned during this period. This value can be compared to 
estimated recidivism rate of alcohol interlocks during the ban period at 3-6% [15, 16], 
suggesting the rate of drivers on the road while banned is higher. Never held ($256k) and 
unlicensed ($257k) were higher than cancelled and disqualified, but respectively twice and 
four times less common. 
 
3. Unlicensed driving prevention technologies 
 
An EDLI is build to link the vehicle’s ignition with the driver’s licence, so that only a driver 
with a valid licence can start the vehicle. Although not entirely necessary, the ability to verify 
the identity of the driver is desirable for any EDLI in order to limit fraud. Indeed one could 
fraud the system by borrowing the valid licence of a friend or relative. A literature review has 
allowed identifying five fairly established biometric technologies to be paired with an 
Electronic Driver Licence (EDL), which will allow verifying the identity of the person 
                                                 
1
 Includes drivers that have served their disqualifications period and never re-applied, interstate drivers, and 
possibly some never licensed drivers 
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presenting the EDL. A standalone EDL interlock without biometric verification is also 
discussed. The advantages and inconvenient of those technologies are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the literature review for EDL interlock and biometrics 
Technology Efficiency
2
 Costs
3
 Advantages Limitations Practicality References  
EDL 
interlock 
99.9% $200 
High reliability; 
good user 
acceptance; EDL 
already 
implemented in 
QLD; low cost 
Easily 
circumvented 
Technology 
already trialled 
(Sweden) and 
proven to be well   
accepted by drivers 
but has not been 
pushed to any 
deployment. 
Would form the 
necessary basis for 
any EDLI. QLD 
licences could 
easily be converted 
[1, 6-8, 17, 
18] [19] 
EDLI & 
fingerprints 
99% 
 
$220 
Low costs; high 
reliability; ease of 
use; current   
public   
acceptance; 
ICAO compliant 
Fraud is 
possible; scaling 
up issue with 
existing EDLI 
systems 
Widely available 
technology; already 
exists for fleet 
operators. Steering 
wheel sensors may 
be a practical way 
to verify driver’s 
identity over time, 
[9, 20-25] 
EDLI & 
finger 
vascular 
patterns 
98% $300 
Low costs; high 
reliability; fraud-
resistant; ease of 
use 
Not ICAO-
compliant, 
acceptance 
issues, limited 
research on 
efficiency 
Available 
commercially and 
can be combined 
with fingerprints 
for improved 
reliability 
[20, 26, 27] 
EDLI & 
speech 
recognition 
80% $205 
Low costs; ease 
of use; simple 
hardware;  
Low efficiency; 
vulnerable to 
environmental 
conditions; not 
fraud-resistant; 
privacy issues 
Natural to use and 
not complex to 
install, but have 
lower performance 
than other 
technologies and 
could be rejected 
by public 
[20, 28-34] 
EDLI & 
face 
recognition 
85% $220 
Ease of use; 
continuous 
verification easy; 
good public 
acceptance (less 
invasive); already 
in use in QLD, 
VIC, NSW for 
licence 
applicants; ICAO 
compliant 
Low efficiency; 
capture time is 
long; vulnerable 
to environmental 
conditions; not 
fraud-resistant 
privacy issues 
Some alcohol 
interlock already 
use face pictures, 
and the technology 
is viewed as less 
invasive than other 
biometrics, but 
performance is 
major issue 
[20, 30, 35-
39] 
EDLI &  
iris 
recognition 
99% $1,000 
Very high 
reliability; fraud-
resistant; ICAO 
compliant 
High cost; 
difficult to use;  
bulky sensors; 
privacy issues; 
high false 
negative rate 
Widely available 
technology but has 
practicality issues 
for implementation 
in vehicles (e.g. the 
“stop and stare” 
interface), as well 
as a much higher 
cost than any other 
[20, 40, 41] 
                                                 
2
 For systems using the EDL interlock and a biometric technology, the efficiency is a combination of the two 
systems’ rates 
3
 Estimated cost per vehicle per system 
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4. EDLI implementation scenarios 
 
4.1 Scenarios 
 
A total of 5 technologies are considered in 5 different exposure (implementation) scenarios, 
shown in Table 2. Those scenarios are designed to propose different strategies to implement 
EDLI and find the best returns. Known high-risk groups of drivers, and high-cost categories 
are notably targeted, following the suggestions laid out by Catchpole [5], in particular drivers 
under 21 who are the second most represented age group and the third costliest ($258K per 
driver). Focusing on offenders and recidivists offers a realistic approach to implementation, 
comparable to alcohol interlock programs currently in force throughout Australia. Another 
scenario considers a progressive fleet-wide implementation.  
 
Table 2: Details of the implementation scenarios 
Scenario 
Nb. of vehicles 
equipped yearly 
1: Fleet-wide implementation, all new registered vehicles  90,512 
2: Mandatory implementation for all banned drivers 202,769 
3: Mandatory implementation for all banned drivers under the age of 21 26,484 
4: Mandatory implementation for all banned drivers with any previous 
bans, i.e. recidivists 
38,323 
5: Mandatory implementation for all banned drivers with any previous 
bans, i.e. recidivists, and under the age of 21 
5,005 
 
4.2 Expected benefits 
 
The expected benefits of an EDLI are calculated from the number of crashes that could be 
prevented by this system, depending on a number of parameters: efficiency, non-
circumvention rate, and penetration ratio (exposure). If it were possible to prevent all the 
crashes related to unlicensed driving, the maximum benefit would be equal to $271.6 million 
per annum. However, the actual number of UDC prevented by any system will be smaller. 
There were 1,061 UDC per year on average in Queensland between 2005 and 2013; an 
exposure scenario as defined for scenario 2 in Table 2 would have a maximum impact on 
513/1061 = 48.31% of the crashes (513 banned ULD per year would be prevented to be on 
the road). With an efficiency of 100% and a non-circumvention rate of 100%, this would 
result in a saving of $128.5 million per annum. Efficiency rates are given in Section 3. The 
non-circumvention rate represents the system’s ability to resist fraud, spoofing4, or general 
circumvention (avoidance) by users. Previous research on alcohol interlock programs 
suggests that such rate varies from 3 to 6% [15, 16]; in 90% of the cases the offender was 
simply driving a different vehicle than the one equipped with the system. An EDL interlock 
would be circumventable notably by using someone else’s licence; such interlock combined 
with any biometric technology would be much harder to circumvent, depending on the nature 
of the biometric technology used. The following best non-circumvention rate will be used in 
this study: EDL interlock 70%; fingerprints 95%; finger vascular patterns 97.3%; speech 
                                                 
4
 Spoofing is defined as presenting a fake biometric record to the system, such as fake fingerprints made of resin 
for a fingerprint sensor or holding a picture of a different person in front of the camera for a face recognition 
based system. 
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recognition 80%; face recognition 85%; iris scan 97.3%. The 97.3% value stems from a 3% 
rate recidivism, where 90% are driving a different vehicle as mentioned previously. 
 
4.3 System costs 
Table 3: Candidate technologies costs 
 
EDL 
Interlock 
EDL + 
fingerprints 
EDL + 
finger veins 
EDL + 
speech 
EDL + 
face 
EDL + 
Iris 
Device cost per vehicle $200 $220 $300 $205 $220 $1,000 
Device cost including 
program (scenario 1) 
$366 $386 $466 $371 $386 $1,166 
Device cost including 
program (scenario 4) 
$591 $611 $691 $594 $611 $1,391 
 
The costs for an EDLI program include capital costs and operational costs. Operational costs 
are not included in this analysis; indeed the maintenance cost of most systems is likely to be 
low or null. Costs accrued over the program’s lifespan are discounted back to the first year 
using a discount rate of 4% to 7%. The device cost includes the device itself (electronics, 
sensors) and the labour cost for the installation in the vehicle (based upon costs for alcohol 
interlock programs in Victoria and Queensland). Some of this cost could be assumed by the 
drivers themselves, such as in the existing alcohol interlock programs. A further “program 
cost” has to be included to represent the capital investments necessary to adapt the 
Queensland EDL program so it can support the EDLI (e.g. including the proper information 
on the licence chip, installing the infrastructure to update cards in TMR public locations, etc.); 
this cost is estimated to be $15 million for the present analysis, about half the cost of the 
original program. This program cost is reported on the drivers using an EDLI. 
 
5. Benefit-cost ratios 
 
Due to the nature of the BCR analysis exercise, a number of assumptions are taken when 
evaluating the efficiency of the system to be implemented: it is assumed that (i) only single 
and double vehicles UDC are preventable; (ii) costs are mostly capital cost; (iii) the program 
cost is identical for all EDLI type; (iv) EDLI are installed in only one vehicle per driver; (v) 
the minimum circumvention rate is 3%; (vi) disqualified drivers are disqualified for, on 
average, 1 year at maximum; (vii) the proportion of ULD driving a new vehicle is the same as 
the general population.     
 
A lot of variables are not well known or defined: for example, it is difficult to put numbers on 
notions such as the likelihood that a banned driver would use a vehicle owned by a friend or 
relative (i.e. the non-circumvention rate defined in section 4.2). To compensate for such 
limitations, sensitivity analysis is used to reflect different scenarios and provide a better 
understanding on how each specific variable affect the expected benefits. We do so for the 
discount rate (4, 5, and 7%) because different government agencies use different rate [2], and 
the non-circumvention rate (best, best minus 10%, and best minus 20%). Results are shown in 
Table 4 to 8. 
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Table 4: Scenario 1: 10 years, program cost $15 million 
Technology 
EDL interlock fingerprints finger veins speech face iris 
Discount rate 
Best non-circumvention 
4% 5.10 6.51 5.46 4.61 5.00 2.20 
5% 4.84 6.17 5.18 4.37 4.74 2.09 
7% 4.36 5.56 4.67 3.94 4.27 1.88 
Best non-circumvention-10% 
4% 4.37 5.82 4.90 4.03 4.41 1.98 
5% 4.15 5.52 4.65 3.82 4.18 1.88 
7% 3.74 4.97 4.19 3.44 3.77 1.69 
Best non-circumvention-20% 
4% 3.64 5.14 4.34 3.45 3.82 1.75 
5% 3.45 4.87 4.11 3.27 3.62 1.66 
7% 3.11 4.39 3.71 2.95 3.27 1.50 
 
Table 5: Scenario 2: 5 years, program cost $15 million 
Technology 
EDL interlock fingerprints finger veins speech face iris 
Discount rate 
Best non-circumvention 
4% 7.49 9.39 7.48 6.73 7.21 2.63 
5% 7.35 9.22 7.34 6.61 7.08 2.58 
7% 7.10 8.89 7.09 6.38 6.83 2.49 
Best non-circumvention-10% 
4% 6.42 8.40 6.71 5.89 6.36 2.36 
5% 6.30 8.25 6.59 5.78 6.25 2.32 
7% 6.08 7.96 6.36 5.58 6.03 2.24 
Best non-circumvention-20% 
4% 5.35 7.41 5.94 5.05 5.51 2.09 
5% 5.25 7.28 5.83 4.96 5.41 2.05 
7% 5.07 7.02 5.63 4.78 5.22 1.98 
 
Table 6: Scenario 3: 5 years, program cost $15 million 
Technology 
EDL interlock fingerprints finger veins speech face iris 
Discount rate 
Best non-circumvention 
4% 12.28 16.09 14.81 11.16 12.36 8.27 
5% 12.05 15.80 14.54 10.96 12.14 8.12 
7% 11.63 15.25 14.03 10.58 11.71 7.84 
Best non-circumvention-10% 
% 10.52 14.40 13.29 9.77 10.91 7.42 
5% 10.33 14.14 13.05 9.59 10.71 7.29 
7% 9.97 13.64 12.59 9.26 10.34 7.03 
Best non-circumvention-20% 
4% 8.77 12.70 11.76 8.37 9.45 6.57 
5% 8.61 12.47 11.55 8.22 9.28 6.45 
7% 8.31 12.04 11.15 7.93 8.96 6.23 
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Table 7: Scenario 5: 5 years, program cost $15 million 
Technology 
EDL interlock fingerprints finger veins speech face iris 
Discount rate 
Best non-circumvention 
4% 7.33 9.54 8.55 6.65 7.33 4.29 
5% 7.20 9.37 8.40 6.53 7.19 4.21 
7% 6.95 9.04 8.10 6.31 6.94 4.07 
Best non-circumvention-10% 
4% 6.28 8.53 7.67 5.82 6.47 3.85 
5% 6.17 8.38 7.53 5.72 6.35 3.78 
7% 5.96 8.09 7.27 5.52 6.13 3.65 
Best non-circumvention-20% 
4% 5.24 7.53 6.79 4.99 5.60 3.41 
5% 5.14 7.39 6.67 4.90 5.50 3.35 
7% 4.96 7.14 6.44 4.73 5.31 3.23 
 
Table 8: Scenario 5: 5 years, program cost $15 million 
Technology 
EDL interlock fingerprints finger veins speech face iris 
Discount rate 
Best non-circumvention 
4% 2.92 3.90 3.86 2.67 3.00 3.21 
5% 2.86 3.83 3.79 2.62 2.94 3.16 
7% 2.76 3.70 3.66 2.53 2.84 3.05 
Best non-circumvention-10% 
4% 2.50 3.49 3.46 2.33 2.64 2.88 
5% 2.46 3.43 3.40 2.29 2.60 2.83 
7% 2.37 3.31 3.28 2.21 2.50 2.73 
Best non-circumvention-20% 
4% 2.08 3.08 3.06 2.00 2.29 2.55 
5% 2.05 3.02 3.01 1.96 2.25 2.51 
7% 1.97 2.92 2.90 1.89 2.17 2.42 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Overall, most of the proposed scenarios yield good results with BCRs above 1 for many 
technologies and scenarios; however, there are large variations in terms of those values. We 
consider that a BCR above 3 corresponds to excellent returns, whereas BCR between 1 and 3 
are described as acceptable: still good but not as desirable as a value over 3. 
 
Regardless of the scenario the combination of EDLI plus fingerprint biometrics is 
systematically the best performing technology, followed closely by the EDL and vascular 
patterns biometrics one. This can be explained by the relatively high success rate of those 
technologies and their limited capital costs. Vascular pattern biometrics also provide the 
advantage of a very high non-circumvention rate as it requires a living hand to function 
properly, unlike fingerprint sensors that can be fooled by fake fingers made of plastics. The 
EDLI technology itself also offers good results, its lower non-circumvention rate being 
compensated by the small cost associated with this system. Other ICAO-compliant biometrics 
perform poorly compared those previously mentioned technologies, even if their BCRs are 
above 1. Iris recognition for example is hindered by a higher cost (5 times higher than 
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fingerprint biometrics), and face recognition is hindered by its poor efficiency. These 
technologies have the advantage of already being standardised and potentially easier to accept 
for the public (at least for those already collected in biometric passports), but their 
disadvantages are too high to justify implementation, especially when compared to simpler 
technologies. Most technologies appear fairly robust (in BCR terms) to increased non-
circumvention rates. This can interpreted as a good result, as in the worst scenario the 
circumvention rate can reach 30%, which would be considered excessively high for an 
identification system based on biometrics. It is possible to explain some of this robustness by 
the exposure models chosen in the scenario: maximising exposure to the EDLI will allow 
preventing more crashes, even if they system can still be relatively easily bypassed. A single 
prevented fatality saves the same amount of money as needed to equip 5,568 vehicles with a 
simple EDLI, even assuming worst costs. But it is more likely for expensive technologies 
such as iris recognition to be pushed under 1 when the circumvention rate increases. 
 
In all scenarios the simple EDLI is also always yielding at least acceptable BCR, usually 
similar to those of the EDL + fingerprint option, and better than using speech recognition or 
iris scan. Based on this result, one can argue that there is little need to pair the EDLI with any 
biometric technology, however simple, to get appreciable results. On the other hand, the price 
difference between an EDLI and an EDLI with fingerprint sensor is minimal for the in-vehicle 
device, and adding this sensor does improve efficiency by making fraud and circumvention 
harder. A limitation of the present study is that the program cost is assumed to be the same for 
all technologies. It could be reasonably argued that only implementing an EDLI would cost 
less than adding any biometric sensing because TMR would not have to invest in those 
sensors and ensure that the licences’ chip contains this data. 
 
In terms of the exposure scenarios, the fleet-wide mandatory implementation (scenario 1) is 
not found to be a cost-effective strategy compared to the other approaches: if it does achieve 
acceptable BCRs, it does so only over 10 years while every other marginal technologies do so 
over only 5 years. Furthermore, practical considerations in terms of mandating the installation 
of advanced biometric technologies into all newly registered vehicles make this scenario not 
very practical as a quick solution to the ULD problem. 
 
The other scenarios present more targeted approached, based on convictions and age groups, 
and inspired by current practice for alcohol interlocks. The best scenario is scenario 3, 
showing returns of up to 16 times the investment, where all banned drivers under the age of 
21 are issued with a mandatory EDLI system. Returns are high in this scenario because 
although drivers under the age of 21 represent 28.34% of the per annum cost of UDC, they 
only account for 13.06% of all the driving bans in Queensland every year. This allows a 
minimal investment compared to the number of saved crashes. Furthermore, the cost per 
driver for this category is $258k over 2005-13, the third highest among age groups. Scenario 
2 (mandating the EDLI for all banned drivers) and Scenario 4 (mandating the EDLI for 
recidivist) also provide excellent results overall. Those two scenarios maximise exposure, 
explaining their good performance. The number of crashes saved may be even increased by 
combining the EDLI with an alcohol interlock in those scenarios, reducing overall costs. 
 
The worst scenario is scenario 5: mandatory system for all recidivists under the age of 21. 
Although this category has shown to generate some of the highest costs, BCRs are the lowest 
of all scenarios because the exposure is fairly limited: only about 5,000 drivers every year. 
Note that in absolute terms scenario 5 still has an acceptable assessment, and some 
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technologies (EDL + fingerprints or vascular patterns) are above 3. Nonetheless, when 
compared with the returns yielded by other scenario, scenario 5 makes little sense. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we identified in-vehicle technologies that could be used to curb the problem of 
unlicensed driving, which cost $300 million per year in Queensland, then computed the 
benefit-cost ratios [11-14] for various implementation scenarios of such technologies in order 
to obtain preliminary recommendation as to which technology would be the most beneficial. 
Combining an electronic driving licence interlock with a biometric technology to verify the 
identity of the person presenting the licence, would allow preventing a large number of 
crashes involving unlicensed drivers every year. The ICAO-compliant fingerprint recognition 
technology can be recommended for implementation, as it provides returns on investment of 
up to 16 times depending on the implementation scenario. Despite its increased ability to be 
circumvented, our analysis has shown that a simple EDL interlock is sufficient, with returns 
up to 12. Both can thus be recommended for implementation in Queensland. In terms of how 
to implement those technologies, our study has shown that the best approach would be to 
mandate the installation of the system in the vehicle of all disqualified and suspended drivers, 
similarly to how drivers disqualified from driving due to DUI offences are mandated to install 
an alcohol interlock in some states. Furthermore, an implementation targeting such drivers 
under the age of 21 only would yield the best relative returns; another approach targeting 
redividing offenders would also provide good returns. Those can also be recommended for 
implementation.  
 
Those preliminary recommendations need to be further refined by improving the resolution of 
this study in terms of the operational costs and the capital costs associated with the program. 
Additionally, an important recommendation from the literature is to combine multiple 
biometric technologies to improve the system’s accuracy; in the present study we only 
combined EDL with one biometric technology, thus a new study proposing new technological 
combinations would be warranted. 
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